

Understanding Radicalists and Fundamentalist Islamic Groups in Indonesia: Ideology and Model of Movement

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Abstract: *Since the Reformation Era, various Islamic organizations or groups have emerged in Indonesia with different ideologies and movement models, such as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI), the Indonesian Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), and Jemaah Islamiyah. Most Indonesian Muslims do not warmly welcome their presence as the spirit of their struggle is not appropriate with the character and culture of the Indonesian people. They often use violence and even terror in struggling for Islam with the reason of *amr ma'ruf nahi munkar* (enjoining good and forbidding evil). So it is not surprising that the government recently dissolved the HTI and FPI. By using a qualitative approach, this study aims to uncover their ideology and movement model and the ideologies that influence them. From the data obtained from various related literature such as textbooks, journals, and the web, this study finds that these Islamic groups are ideologically influenced by trans-national Islamic groups with fundamentalism and even radicalism characters. They disagree with the Indonesian government system, which is considered secular and incompatible with Islamic values. They often use violence and terror to enforce Islamic shari'ah and even change the NKRI system with the system of Khilafat Islamiyah (Islamic caliphate).*

Keywords: *Radicalist, fundamentalist, Islamic caliphate, shari'ah.*

Abstrak: Sejak Era Reformasi, berbagai ormas atau kelompok Islam bermunculan di Indonesia dengan ideologi dan model gerakan yang berbeda, seperti Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), Ikhwanul Muslimin Indonesia, Front Pembela Islam (FPI), dan Jemaah Islamiyah. Sebagian besar umat Islam Indonesia tidak menyambut baik kehadiran mereka karena semangat perjuangan mereka tidak sesuai dengan karakter dan budaya masyarakat Indonesia. Mereka sering menggunakan kekerasan bahkan teror dalam memperjuangkan Islam dengan dalih *amr ma'ruf nahi munkar*. Maka tidak heran jika belakangan ini organisasi tersebut, khususnya HTI dan FPI, dibubarkan oleh pemerintah. Dengan menggunakan pendekatan kualitatif, penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengungkap ideologi dan model gerakan mereka serta ideologi yang mempengaruhinya. Dari data yang diperoleh dari berbagai literatur terkait seperti buku teks, jurnal, dan web, penelitian ini menemukan bahwa kelompok-kelompok Islam tersebut secara ideologis dipengaruhi oleh kelompok-kelompok Islam transnasional dengan karakter fundamentalisme bahkan radikalisme. Mereka tidak setuju dengan sistem pemerintahan Indonesia yang dianggap sekuler dan bertentangan dengan nilai-nilai Islam. Mereka kerap menggunakan kekerasan dan teror untuk menegakkan syari'at Islam bahkan mengubah bentuk NKRI (Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia) dengan sistem Khilafah Islamiyah.

Kata Kunci: Radikalisme, fundamentalisme, khilafah Islamiyah, syari'at Islam.

Introduction

The government finally dissolved HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia) on July 19, 2017, by revoking this organization's legal status. The dissolution was taken as HTI has an ideology contrary to Pancasila that is to establish *Khilafat Islamiyah*. The pledge of thousands of students of the Bogor Agricultural Institute (IPB), March 2016, who declared wholeheartedly to believe that secularism is only a source of suffering for the people proves this.¹ Besides, HTI's preaching activities through their figures, such as Felix Siau and their cadres at the campus, show that HTI's ideology endangers NKRI (Unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia). HTI has a mission to unite all Muslims globally under one Islamic flag, namely *Khilafat Islamiyah*. They want to revive the past glory of Islam. However, this is not in line with the pluralistic character of the Indonesian nation. The public needs to know that HTI

¹ Vedi R. Hadiz, *Islamic Populism in Indonesia and the Middle East*, (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2016), h. 143.

is an international political organization, but it registered itself as a mass organization (ormas) in Indonesia.

Then, in December 2020, the government also dissolved FPI (Front Pembela Islam, Islamic Defenders Front). The organization, which has been established for more than two decades, was banned due to its role in some riots in this country recently, especially its leader, Rizieq Shihab. Rizieq himself has just returned from Saudi Arabia since 2017 for seclusion and avoided the legal issue that trapped him.² FPI is the most vocal Islamic organization, especially in dealing with women's leadership issues, non-Muslim leadership, pluralism, etc. FPI often uses a harsh approach in da'wah (calling people to Islam). Every month of Ramadan, its members do not hesitate to sweep the stalls and entertainment places that are still open during the day. They argue that their action is to enjoin good and forbid evil (*amar ma'ruf nahi munkar*) as they thought the government remains silent to such kinds of wrongdoings. Yet, FPI's approach in da'wah is not always welcomed by other Muslims, such as from the NU circle, as it employs a harsh manner rather than a soft and gentle approach as enjoined by the Qur'an.

HTI and FPI are a few examples of Islamic organizations whose existence is not welcomed by the government and the community. The proof is that these two mass organizations' disbandment did not cause a reaction from mainstream Islamic groups. Even if there is resistance, it will not lead to large-scale demonstrations. This study aims to identify and find out the characters and models of da'wah of the Islamic groups that are considered fundamentalists and radicalists in Indonesia, not only HTI and FPI, but also IM/PKS, JI, and MMI. This study would reveal these Islamic groups' ideology, their model of movement, the thoughts that influence them, and their goals of struggle in Indonesia. This study is based on qualitative research, and data were obtained from analysis of the literature and any related texts. The author hopes that these Islamic groups' character and movements can be understood and identified by the broader community so that their existence can be easily

² Wahyudi Akmaliah, "The Demise of Moderate Islam: New Media, Contestation, and Reclaiming Religious Authority", *Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies*, Vol. 10, No.1 (2020), h. 3.

recognized amid society. Finally, the NKRI and Pancasila ideology are still protected from the threats of transnational ideologies that are incompatible with the Indonesian people's characters and culture.

Radicalism and Fundamentalism

Before discussing further the history of the emergence of radicalist and fundamentalist Muslim groups, we must clarify the terms, *radicalist*, and *fundamentalist*. In Encyclopedia,³ the word “radical” is synonymous with the words extreme, drastic, thorough, sweeping, and revolutionary.⁴ It stems from the word “radix”, a Latin word for “root”. While, technically, the word “radical” is used to designate individuals, parties, and movements that wish to alter drastically any existing practices, institution, or social system. According to oxford dictionaries, it is also used to denote a person who advocates thorough or complete political or social reform; a member of a political party, or part of a party pursuing such aims. Then, who is a radicalist Muslim? It is difficult to find consensus among the scholars regarding the definition of this term. Even though several books have been written on this topic, but it seems to be no agreement upon the technical definition of the term. The writers usually use the term without giving a clear definition. Yet, there are some opinions regarding the definition of the term for instance found in Schmid's paper.

The following are some of the definitions chosen from Schmid's paper; Taarnby (2005) defines it as ‘the progressive personal development from law-abiding Muslim to Militant Islamist’, Jensen (2006): ‘a process during which people gradually adopt views and ideas which might lead to the legitimization of political violence’, Ongering (2007): ‘process of personal development whereby an individual adopts ever more extreme political or politico-religious ideas and goals, becoming convinced that the attainment of these goals justifies extreme methods’, Olesen (2009): ‘the process through which individuals and organizations adopt

³ <http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-3401803495.html> (accessed 9 December 2020).

⁴ P. M. Roget and J. L. Roget. *Roget's Thesaurus*, (Delhi: Aswani Goyal, 1995), h. 448.

violent strategies or threaten to do so –to achieve political goals’.⁵ Schmid himself defines it as an individual or collective (group) process whereby, usually in a situation of political polarization, normal practices of dialogue, compromise, and tolerance between political actors and groups with diverging interests are abandoned by one or both sides in a conflict dyad in favor of a growing commitment to engage in confrontational tactics of conflict-waging.

Also, Ali H. Aslan, in the Turkish Weekly Opinion, writes there are “radical Muslims” who choose violence as their means of political struggle and go down the wrong road.⁶ He underlines that it is not religion itself but a kind of understanding or interpretation of religion. Even it is a political or movement ideology that exploits religion. So it has nothing to do with religion. Apart from scholars’ definition, there are also some definitions given by the government of European countries as follows:

- 1) Veldhuis and Staun as quoted by Schmid (2013: 12) said, in 2006, the European Commission defined radicalization as “the phenomenon of people embracing opinions, views, and ideas which could lead to acts of terrorism”.
- 2) *Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET)* as quoted by Schmid (2013: 12) defines it as a process, by which a person to an increasing extent accepts the use of undemocratic or violent means, including terrorism, in an attempt to reach a specific political/ideological objective.⁷
- 3) *The Netherlands General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD)* as quoted by Schmid (2013:12) defines it as “the (active) pursuit of and/or support to far-reaching changes in society which may constitute a danger to (the continued existence of) the democratic legal order (aim), which may involve the use of undemocratic

⁵ Alex P. Schmid, *Radicalization, De-Radicalization, Counter-Radicalization: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review*, (ICCT, 2013), h. 23.

⁶ Jay Hargett, “So, What Is A Radical Muslim, Anyway?” A paper was presented to the Raleigh Tavern Philosophical Society, (2007), h. 15.

⁷ PET, Danish Intelligence Services, 2009. See also COT, *Radicalization, Recruitment and the EU Counter-radicalization Strategy*, (The Hague: COT, 2008).

methods (means) that may harm the functioning of the democratic legal order (effect)".⁸

- 4) *US Department of Homeland Security (DHS)* as quoted by Schmid (2013: 12) defines it as "the process of adopting an extremist belief system, including the willingness to use, support, or facilitate violence, as a method to effect social change".⁹
- 5) *Swedish Security Service (Säpo)* as quoted by Schmid (2013:12) defines radicalization can be both: "a process that leads to ideological or religious activism to introduce radical change to society" and "a process that leads to an individual or group using, promoting or advocating violence for political aims".¹⁰

From some definitions above, we can find the key point that is violence. So by considering Fred's statement, the authors formulate that radicalist Muslim group is a group that wants to change the social condition or even political to achieve their goal by doing violence to innocent civilians. It is nothing to do with religion but since it is conducted by the Muslim so the term radicalist Muslim emerges. So simply it is the practice of the believer, not religious teaching itself. We will not find the justification of that practice in the Quran. Though, the radicalist Muslim groups themselves may assume that such practice is conducted for enjoining good and forbidding evil (*amr ma'ruf nahi munkar*). Turning to the meaning of fundamentalism which in Arabic word is usually translated as "*uṣūliyya*", it is originally from the Latin word "fundamentum" means "forming a necessary base or core; of central importance", or "affecting or relating to the essential nature of something or the crucial point about an issue", or "a central or primary rule or principle on which something is based".¹¹

⁸ AIVD [Dutch Intelligence and Security Service]. *From Dawa to Jihad: The Various Threats from Radical Islam to the Democratic Legal Order*, (The Hague: AIVD, 2004).

⁹ Homeland Security Institute. *Radicalization: An Overview and Annotated Bibliography of Open-Source Literature. Final Report*, (Arlington: HIS, 2006)

¹⁰ Swedish Security Service, 'Radikalisering och avradikalisering'; see also, Magnus Ranstorp (2009). *Preventing Violent Radicalisation and Terrorism: The Case of Indonesia*. (Stockholm: Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies, 2009).

¹¹ www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/fundamental (accessed 25

While, technically, the term fundamentalism generally describes a religious attitude or organized movement that adheres to most or all of the following characteristics: a holistic approach to religion, one that sees religion as a complete moral or legal code, providing answers for all life's questions; a tendency toward a literal understanding of scriptures; a belief in a foundational golden age, when the principles of the faith were perfectly applied, and a desire to recreate such a period today; suspicion and sometimes renunciation of not only people of other faiths but also supposedly hypocritical adherents of the same faith; and discomfort with or rejection of many aspects of modern, secular societies.¹²

Further, according to Adamec, the designation “fundamentalist” has been applied to puritanical Islamic revivalist movements such as those promoted by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792), Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949), Sayyid Abul A’la al-Maududi (1903–1979), and Mulla Muhammad ‘Umar (b. ca. 1960) of Afghanistan. Supporters of Muslim “fundamentalism” have come to be called Islamists.¹³ Besides, the term has come to mean any religious group rigidly resisting change in the modern world. When applied to Islam, it is often understood as synonymous with terrorism, and, for this and all of its other pejorative meanings, many reject its applicability to Islam. Some scholars see fundamentalism as part of ongoing reformist action in Islamic history, while, others see it as a purely modernist movement.¹⁴

Also, Azra states that there are at least four basic principles of fundamentalism. *The first* is oppositionalism which means that any kind of new thinking or change which contradicts the reliability of religion must be opposed. *The second* is opposition to a hermeneutic method in understanding Quran. The fundamentalist believes that Qur’an is

December, 2020).

¹² Richard Martin, et al., *Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World*, (US: Macmillan Reference, 2004), h. 261.

¹³ Ludwig W. Adamec, *Historical Dictionary of Islam*, (US: Scarecrow Press, 2009), h. 104.

¹⁴ Gordon D. Newby, *A Concise Encyclopedia of Islam*, (England: Oneworld Publication, 200), h. 64.

anti-critic. *The third* is their opposition to social plurality. For them, the society must be homogenous and cannot be plural. *The fourth* is their denial of the historical and social development of human beings. The ideal order of religious life of the society is answered by historical nostalgia by asking the Muslims to return to the past.¹⁵

So, there is a difference between radicalism and fundamentalism though these two words are usually used concurrently—like uttering radical fundamentalist—and both may have a rigid understanding of Islam. But in the realization or in obtaining their goal, while radicalism tends to use violent action, fundamentalism chooses smooth manner like using political party. Fundamentalism may be positive and negative. It is considered positive in the sense that their belief in the perfectness of religious teaching as the guidance in life and calling back to the very principle of religion. While the negative impact of such an idea in some cases is extreme radicalism. Thus, every radicalist may possess a fundamental idea but not every fundamentalist uses radical action.

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)

Jemaah Islamiyya or JI is the most dangerous militant Muslim group in South East Asia which aims to establish Islamic State that comprises Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Philippines, and Brunei Darussalam. The government of the United States calls this organization a terrorist as their involvement in some bombing activities in South East Asia, especially in Indonesia. JI, formerly, started their activity as a local jihad group. But, then, after the prominent leader of this organization was dispelled out of Indonesia and began meeting with other jihad groups, their concern became wider comprising South East Asia. Their meeting with the Al-Qaeda network made them an international jihad organization.

JI was established by Abu Bakar Baashir and Abdullah Sungkar in 1993. The origin of this organization can be traced to Darul Islam, a movement following the independence of Indonesia which opposed the

¹⁵ Azyumardi Azra. "Fenomena Fundamentalisme dalam Islam", *Ulumul Qur'an*, Vol. IV, No. 3 (1993), h. 18-19.

Old Order of Sukarno due to their disagreement with the establishment of an Indonesian secular state rather than an Islamic state. Actually, after the death of its leader, S.M. Kartosoewirjo, DI splintered into some factions like Jihad Command (Komando Jihad) led by Haji Ismail Pranoto (Hispran in short) and also JI itself as the most violent faction. It is said that Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Baashir have met Hispran and they were inducted by him into DI. Both, JI and DI had the same mission for the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia. From the reign of Sukarno till Suharto, JI always opposed the government and regarded it as a serious threat to the ruler. Gunaratna says that JI “*urge disobedience to secular authority and not to acknowledge the validity of the Indonesian constitution. Sungkar and Ba’asyir rejected Pancasila as the state ideology and dared to criticize Suharto’s government.*”¹⁶ As their strong opposition to the government, therefore, during Suharto, they were imprisoned for nine years but then gained remission.

As living in Indonesia was not secure and got repression from the government, they fled to Malaysia in 1982 with some of his followers. In Malaysia, they started preaching their ideology about Islam and got some followers who support them for the realization of the Islamic State in South East Asia. One of their well-known followers was Ridwan Isamuddin alias Hambali. In 1996, Hambali, from Malaysia, was invited to go to Afghanistan for military training and support the mujāhidīn for fighting against Uni Soviet in Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1989) which was, according to them, won by mujāhidīn. From that engagement, Hambali came into contact with Al-Qaeda, an Afghanistan-based international terrorist organization lead by Osama bin Laden that received mujāhidīn from all over the world. It is said that he has ever met the mastermind of the 9/11 attack Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and believed to get involved in the planning. Before his return to Malaysia, he visited Karachi for view months and took military training. Two years later, Hambali came back to Malaysia. And in 1991 he traveled to the Philippines as a missionary and lived with a local Muslim family.

¹⁶ Rohan Gunaratna, “Ideology in Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: Lessons from Combating Al-Qaeda and Al-Jemaah Al-Islamiyah in Southeast Asia” *The ideological war on terror: Worldwide strategies for counter-terrorism*, (2007), h. 14.

Then, in 1993, JI was established in Malaysia, preceded by a dispute between Baashir and Sungkar with the Indonesian-based DI named Ajengan Masduki. In the beginning, this group only consisted of view people who had a weekly meetings for religious activities. Later, it became an Islamic movement that called for jihad and was named Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). The members, in the beginning among others, were Ridwan Isamuddin alias Hambali, Abdul Ghani, Jamsari, Matsah, Adnan and Faiz Bafana.¹⁷ Following the collapse of Suharto in 1998, Baashir and Sungkar returned to Indonesia to continue their struggle. One year later, in 1999, Sungkar died and was replaced by Baashir. Baashir then established Indonesian Mujahedeen Council (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, MMI) in 2000. Baashir is also head of Islamic boarding school (Pesantren) Al-Amin, Ngruki, Solo that was established in 1974. The pesantren is assumed to have created many militant Muslims. JI believes that there is no separation between worldly affairs and worship (ibādat). Mankind life in this world is only a means toward eternal life in the hereafter. The disaster which befalls Muslim life is because they separate the affairs of the world from religion.

It is said that this jamā'ah is based upon Al Qur'ān and As-Sunnah in accordance with the understanding of *As-Salafus-Ṣāliḥ* (the Pious Predecessors). The objective of this jamā'ah's struggle is to realize the establishment of Daulah Islāmiyya (Islamic State) as the basis for the formation of the return of Khilāfat 'alā Minhajin-Nubuwwah. To achieve the objective, the jamā'ah's path is *da'wah, tarbiyya, 'amr bi'l ma'rūf wa nahī 'an il munkar* (enjoining good and forbidding evil), *hijrah*, and *jihad fī sabīlillāh*.¹⁸ Further, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, proclaimed that the application of *shari'ah* is essential and argued that its rejection must be countered by *jihad* (Ba'asyir in Awwas, 2001). He believed that the application of *shari'ah* would lead Indonesia out of its crises. In his eyes, *shari'ah* had proved to be a leading political system for about 14 centuries.¹⁹

¹⁷ Rohan Gunaratna, "Ideology in Terrorism.....", h. 15.

¹⁸ Jemaah Islamiyah. "The General Guidelines for Struggle of Jemaah Islamiyah (PUPJI)", Majlis Qiyadah Markaziyah, (1996), h. 29.

¹⁹ Noorhaidi Hasan, "Islamic Militancy, Shari'ah, and Democratic Consolidation

Front Pembela Islam (FPI)

Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, henceforth FPI) is a radical Muslim organization founded by some Arab-descendant *ulama* on 17 August 1998, three months after the collapse of the New Order of Suharto. FPI firstly was initiated at Petamburan, Jakarta, and then openly declared at Pesantren Al-Umm, Ciputat, Tangerang. Jamhari and Jahroni say the founders were motivated by their conviction that Muslims in Indonesia were suppressed by the government. Muslims in Indonesia experienced many cases of abuse of human rights and there had been no fair and just investigation of those cases. Besides, FPI leaders also believed that Islam and Muslim people had been humiliated and that Muslims did not respond appropriately.²⁰

FPI is led by Habib Muhammad Rizieq Shihab. He is “*a former student at LIPIA (Institute of Arabic and Islamic Science) Jakarta who also studied in Saudi Arabia, at King Saud University and by K. H. Misbahul Anam, whose training at Pesantren As-Shidiqiyyah was more in line with that of Nahdlatul Ulama*”.²¹ The establishment of FPI was supported by Jakarta Police Chief, Nugroho Jayusman and often linked with Indonesian National Armed Forces Commander, General Wiranto. And, till this time, FPI is used to close with some politicians and members of security forces, or a governor who has interest with them. Inevitably, they also get funding from them for their operational. FPI's main basis is in Jakarta but they have branches in 28 provinces with many followers. The members of this group are used to wear white robes and turban.

As a socio-religious Islamic organization, FPI cannot be equated with other Muslim extremists like Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). FPI does not use extreme action such as bomb terror to express their disagreement

in Post-Suharto Indonesia” *RSIS Working Paper*, No. 143. Singapore: Nanyang Technological University, (2007), h. 4.

²⁰ Saiful Umam, “Radical Muslim in Indonesia: The Case of Ja’far Umar Thalib and the Laskar Jihad”, *Exploration in Southeast Asian Studies*, Vol. 6, No.1, (2006), h. 10.

²¹ James J. Fox, “Currents in Contemporary Islam in Indonesia”, A paper presented at Harvard Asia Vision 21, (2004), h. 14.

to the government. Yet, they have similarities in certain cases like their agreement in the application of shari'ah. So far, FPI does not seem to oppose the secular system of the government like democracy. As long as the ruler is a Muslim, they can accept it. But, they disagree with woman leadership though she is Muslim. When Megawati Sukarno Putri, Sukarno's daughter, became the first woman Indonesian president (2001-2004), FPI disagreed with her.

The goal of FPI is the application of Islamic shari'ah. Along with it, enjoining good and prohibiting evil (*amr ma'ruf nahi munkar*) is necessary. But, often, they use violence. They campaign against prostitution, alcohol, and gambling. In every fasting month of Ramadan, they always carry out sweeping that is inspecting people in order not to do wrongdoing. For instance, they command people not to open their stall in the daytime. Bar, night club, and massage parlor also must be closed in the night. They, without hesitation, will take violent action against those who oppose them. According to Woodward, FPI *"presents itself as an ally of government security forces in their attempts to control sin and vice. It uses hate speech to motivate and legitimize violent attacks on organizations and individuals it considers to be sinful or religiously deviant"*.²² So, the justification they make for any violence they do is because the security forces do not take action to stop "immorality". Many innocent people became the victims of their violence either Muslim or non-Muslim. There are more than hundreds of violence they have done so far.

Further, FPI also committed a lot of religious violence. They always will be at the forefront against Christianization. The church is not allowed to be built in the neighborhood of Muslims. GKI Yasmin Bogor and HKBP Church Bekasi were few examples of the church that they forced to be closed. FPI also endorsed the Singkil administration to close around 20 churches in Singkil, Aceh. It is very problematic as religious freedom is guaranteed by the Indonesian constitution. But, this group feels that the existence of other religious adherents is a threat for them. As stated above that the main goal of FPI is the application of

²² Mark Woodward, et al., "Hate Speech and Islamic Indonesian Defenders Front", Arizona State University: Center for Strategic Communication, (2012), h. 2.

shari'ah. They do not have any intention to alter the current Indonesian political system. So, “*unlike many other radical Muslim organizations FPI does not locate itself within or frame its actions in terms of discourse concerning either the “purification” of Islamic religious practice or the struggle to establish an explicitly Islamic state, social and political order*”.²³ Apart from that, we do not deny that sometimes FPI members also involve in social charity like helping the victims of natural disasters. But, the authors argue that it is their strategy to get attention from society and to make a good image that they are not like what has been exposed so far as an anarchic Muslim group. In December 2020, the government finally dissolved FPI as its members involved in many riots in the country.

Ikhwanul Muslimin Indonesia and PKS

Ikhwanul Muslimin (IM) or Muslim Brotherhood is a transnational organization that originates from Egypt. IM was established by Hasan al-Banna in 1928. Now, it has many followers around the world and has spread into many countries not only in the Middle East but also in America, Europe, Central Asia, and South East Asia especially Indonesia. Al-Banna died in 1949 in the hand of a government agent and then continued by Sayyid Qutb. Ikhwanul Muslimin or simply known as Ikhwan was divided into two main streams i.e. *Ikhwan-e-Tarbiyat* and *Ikhwan-e-Jihad*. The former struggles through preaching and the latter through jihad or war. In the Ikhwan there is a jihad division which is called *Tanzimul Jihād* to train its member to have prowess in war. It is said that Gamal Abdel Nasser and Anwar Sadat, the former president of Egypt, also joined *Tanzimul Jihād*.²⁴ One of the members in this division is Taqiuddin Nabhani, the founder of Hizbut Tahrir. So, Hizbut Tahrir was born from Ikhwanul Muslimin. It is said that Taqiuddin differs and disagrees with the idea of Al-Banna who accepts the concept of democracy and nationalism. Al-Banna said that as long as the shari'ah law was applied in the democratic system, it does not

²³ Mark Woodward, et al., “Hate Speech and Islamic....”, h. 9.

²⁴ <http://jombang.nu.or.id/gerakan-islam-radikal-di-indonesia> (accessed 17 December 2020).

matter. Whereas, Taqiuddin said that the collapse of the Arab and the Muslim generally is because of being colonized with the ideology of democracy and nationalism.

Then, how did the ideology of IM spread to Indonesia? The ideology of IM was brought to Indonesia by a student, Rahmat Abdullah, who studied in Egypt. But, formally, the establishment of Ikhwanul Muslimin Indonesia (IMI) was in 1994, which was directly led by him. Now, its leader is Hilmi Aminuddin Hasan. IM can be called an intellectual movement rather than jihad movement as their concern is preaching to Muslim people especially the youths to be more Islamic. It means that the Muslim follows the pure Islamic teaching. In this regard, they are like Salafis and have the same goal as that Salafis. So, the stream of this movement that flourishes in Indonesia is ikhwan-e-tarbiyat.

The ideology of Ikhwan easily spreads in Indonesia with the method of *usrat* (family) in the universities. The member of *usrat* consists of seven members with one leader which must be responsible to his group. Among the members, they help one another if one of the members has difficulty, for instance, paying a tuition fee. In a short time, many students join this organization and develop massively. This movement at the campus is then called *Tarbiyat or Dakwah Movement*. Fox says that “*tarbiyah refers to the whole of the process of education or guidance that is to lead to this personal transformation as a total Muslim (kaffah)*”.²⁵ Besides, Machmudi also says that tarbiyah is “*truly a process of Islamisation that encourages deep changes in individuals in terms of morality, intellectuality, and spirituality*”.²⁶

Ironically, this organization not only targets the students of higher education but also the students in secondary school. In universities, there are student organizations called Campus Preaching Organization (Lembaga Dakwah Kampus, LDK) and Indonesian Muslim Student Action Union (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia, KAMMI).

²⁵ James J. Fox, “Currents in Contemporary Islam...”, h. 10.

²⁶ Yon Machmudi. “Islamising Indonesia, The Rise of Jemaah Tarbiyat and The Prosperous Justice Party”, Dissertation, Faculty of Asian Studies, Australian National University, (2006), h. 67.

Through these two student unions, the ideology of Ikhwan is evolved and as a way of recruitment. While, in secondary school especially at senior high school, this ideology is spread through the Body of Islamic Spiritual (Rohani Islam, Rohis). Rohis is the only Islamic student organization that is accepted in the state or public school.²⁷ The key figures of LDK and KAMMI then initiated to establish a political party called as Justice Party (Partai Keadilan, PK) in 1998 which then turned into Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS) in 2003.

In the 2014 general election, fifteen parties took part in the election. And PKS was one of the three parties with an Islamic basis. The other two parties are The Unity and Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP) and The Crescent Star Party (Partai Bulan Bintang, PBB). But, among those three Islamic-based parties, PKS is the only party that is well known by many Indonesian Muslim scholars for their struggle in the application of shari'ah. Though, in their political platform, they do not mention clearly about this agenda. So, in this regard, they use a hidden agenda. They also like to deny that allegation. Even, it is said that PKS, for the long term, has an agenda in the establishment of the Islamic caliphate. Wahid says as follows:

*“Like JI, the manifesto of the establishment of PKS is the struggle for the Islamic caliphate. Like JI, PKS has a secret system in organizing and recruiting members that are a cell system borrowed from Ikhwanul Muslimin. But, unlike JI that takes a revolutionary manner, PKS prefers to take an evolutionary manner. JI opposes directly to the government but JI will not win. Meanwhile, PKS utilize their position in the parliament and their cadre network to realize their goal and spread their ideology”.*²⁸

So, the existence of PKS endangers the Indonesian government as they have their representatives in the parliament. And dismissing this party is also impossible as it is against the constitution and in

²⁷ Abdurrahman Wahid, *Ilusi Negara Islam*, (Jakarta: Wahid Institute, 2009), h. 204.

²⁸ Abdurrahman Wahid, *Ilusi Negara Islam...*” h. 27.

contradiction with the principle of democracy which respects the freedom of speech and the establishment of a party or mass organization. It is not impossible that in the future PKS can win the election and become dominant in the parliament and start realizing their agenda. Ikhwanul Muslimin Indonesia and PKS are inter-connected. As a socio-religious group, IMI spreads its influence through school and campus. The youths are their main target. Meanwhile, their political vehicle is PKS. Their agenda is the formalization of the shari'ah and also the establishment of the Islamic caliphate. Also, the vision of PKS states the realization of civil society (*madani*) as established by the prophet in Medina.²⁹ So, instead of using violence or extreme action, they prefer to take a smooth manner that can be accepted by society.

Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI)

Another extremist Indonesian Muslim group is Indonesian Mujahidin Council (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, henceforth MMI). MMI is regarded as an extremist Muslim group is because of its connection with Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) which has been discussed before. These two organizations also have the same goal. But, if the JI movement embraces South East Asia and is often called an al-Qaeda accomplice, MMI struggles for local Indonesia. MMI was founded in 2000 as a result of the congress of Indonesian Mujahidin in Yogyakarta. It is said that the congress was attended by 1800 participants from 24 provinces in Indonesia. The participants had different background but their aim was similar. Some were veterans of the Afghanistan war. The others were religious leaders who had an aim in the implementation of shari'ah in Indonesia. While, the rests were the former members of Darul Islam (DI) movement, a Muslim separatist group led by Kartosuwiryo that found the Indonesian Islamic State (Negara Islam Indonesia, NNI) in West Java right after independence. The latter raises an assumption that MMI was a continuation of DI. It is justified also with their similar goal.³⁰

²⁹ <http://www.pks.or.id/content/visi-dan-misi> (accessed 19 December 2020).

³⁰ Saiful Umam, "Radical Muslim in Indonesia....", h. 9.

The leader of MMI is Abu Bakar Baashir, the former leader of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). Among the prominent members are Muhammad Thalib, Abu Jibriel, and Irfan S. Awwas. Baashir along with Abdullah Sungkar are well known for their harsh opposition to the government. They were jailed by Suharto for four years with an accusation of establishing an Islamic state. But after released, they did not stop opposing the government. When Suharto applied Pancasila as the sole basis of all organizations, both rejected it. Suharto tried to arrest them again but they fled to Malaysia early. In Malaysia, they established Jemaah Islamiyah with other Muslim jihadis. They returned to Indonesia after the resignation of Suharto in 1998. In Indonesia, they still proceed with their mission and become the opponent of the government ever.

Abu Bakar Baashir manages an Islamic boarding school (Pesantren) Al-Amin, Ngruki, Solo, that he built-in 1974. This pesantren is used as a method to disseminate his ideology and finally to recruit MMI members. Having thousands santri (student at pesantren), Al-Amin teaches traditional fundamentalist Islam so the graduates of this pesantren will possess radical-fundamentalist ideology. Anyhow, MMI is recognized for its struggle in opposing the secular-based government of Indonesia and tries to change it with an Islamic state. They argue that only the law of Allah that is shari'ah should be applied. Muslims cannot use secular laws made by human beings. And, the application of shari'ah cannot be realized without establishing an Islamic state. So, the establishment of the Islamic state is necessary. According to them, the struggle for it is jihad. And, die in jihad is considered a martyr; and this is what they are looking for.

Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI)

Like Ikhwanul Muslimin, Hizbut Tahrir (HT) which means "Liberation Party" is a transnational organization. HT was founded by Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani in 1952 in Jordan. He was born in Palestine and graduated from Al-Azhar University and Dar al-'Ulum in Cairo, Egypt.³¹

³¹ Masdar Hilmy, "Manufacturing the "Ontological Enemy" Socio-Political Construction of anti-Democracy, Discourses among HTI Activists in Post-New Order" *Journal of Indonesian Islam* Vol. 03, No. 02, (2009), h. 347.

As explained before that Taqi al-Din was formerly the follower of Ikhwanul Muslim. But, Ikhwanul Muslimin's acceptance of the system of democracy and nationalism made him establishing Hizbut Tahrir. Taqi al-Din argues that democracy and nationalism are a new model of colonization of the West to Islam. And due to these secular systems, Muslims are in backwardness. Therefore, by establishing Hizbut Tahrir, Taqi al-Din want to liberate Muslims from the subjugation of the West and finally to liberate Palestine from Israel.

HT is forbidden in some Middle East countries as their agenda in the establishment of the Islamic State. HT is banned in Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon. Even some of their followers were persecuted. But, as a transnational organization, HT ideology has spread throughout the world. Even, in Europe, like in the United Kingdom, this organization flourishes very quickly. And finally, regardless of their dangerous idea, HT also has influenced a lot of Indonesian Muslims. The ideology of Hizbut Tahrir spread to Indonesia was brought by Abdurrahman al-Baghdadi, Hizbut Tahrir leader in Australia, who moved to Bogor, West Java in 1982. He was invited by KH. Abdullah bin Nuh, the principal of Pesantren Al-Ghazali and the lecturer in the Literary Faculty of the University of Indonesia.³² Like Ikhwanul Muslimin Indonesia, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) also spread their ideology through campus. They start influencing the students to join their discussion and little by little their ideology is known by the students. This learning circle known as *halaqah* is held continuously every week.

In the *halaqah*, the students are then indoctrinated with the idea like *Shakhshiyah Islamiyah* (Islamic Personality), *Fikr al-Islam* (Islamic Thought), and *Nizam al-Islam* (Islamic System). The fact, the students who join the *halaqah* or those who are interested in it mostly have a non-religious educational background. It is important to know that education in Indonesia was divided into Islamic schools (Madrasah) and public schools. In the madrasah, the students learn many Islamic subjects as

³² Agus Salim, "The Rise of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (1982-2004): Its Political Opportunity Structure, Resource Mobilization, and Collective Action Frames". Master Thesis, UIN Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta, (2005), h. 348.

compared to those in the public school. So, the students who join HTI commonly graduated from public schools.

The ideology of HTI spread rapidly throughout universities in Indonesia like The Institute of Agriculture Bogor (IPB), Institute of Technology Bandung (ITB), Padjadjaran University (UNPAD) Bandung, Gajah Mada University (UGM) Yogyakarta, Airlangga University (UNAIR) Malang, Hasanuddin University (UNHAS) Makassar, and many other universities which are notably secular campus. Even, HTI also can be found in Islamic-based universities like State Islamic University (UIN) Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta, UIN Maulana Malik Ibrahim Malang, etc. HTI spread its ideology through *halaqah* activity and student organizations. Apart from that, HTI also actively propagates their ideology by publishing fliers entitled *Al-Islam* that they spread in the mosques especially after congregation prayer.

As stated on their official website, the purpose of HTI is the establishment of the Islamic caliphate (*Khilāfat Islāmiyya*). To realize that agenda, there are several steps they set up. First is creating an Islamic personality (*al-takwīn al-shakhṣiyah al-Islāmiyah*). Second is awakening (*al-tau'īyyah*). The third is interaction with communities (*al-tafā'ul ma'a al-'Ummah*). In this stage, HTI members involve in social activities or charity to help society. Fourth is intellectual movement (*harkat al-tatsqīf*). In this stage, HTI members are taught about the weakness of capitalism and offer Islam as the solution. And the last is the establishment of the Islamic state (*al-takwīn al-daulah al-Islāmiyah*) (<http://jombang.nu.or.id/gerakan-islam-radikal-di-indonesia>, accessed on 7 December 2020).

HTI defines *khilāfat* as the system of leadership for the whole Muslims in the world and at the same time to preach Islam to the entire world. HTI uses the word *khilāfat* and *Imāmat* interchangeably. Some other definitions are also given by Muslim scholars. As stated by Fattah and Belhaj, according to al-Mawardi in his book *al-Ahkām al-Sulṭāniyah*, *imamat* is elected as the successor of the prophethood to maintain religion and administer the worldly affairs. Meanwhile, al-Baidhawi in his book *Hashiyah* defines *khilāfat* as the successor of

the prophet by a person among the people to constitute *shari'ah*, and maintaining the property of the *ummah* that should be followed by the whole *ummah*. Ibn Khaldun in his *Muqaddimah* also defines that *khilāfat* is the administrator of human affairs based on the guideline of the *shari'ah* for their interest both in this world and hereafter.³³

So, *khilāfat* is the system of government or leadership in Islam while the leader of this system is called as *khalīfa*. In the history of Islam, it refers to the leadership of Abu Bakar, Umar, Uṣman, and Ali after the demise of the Prophet Muhammad. After that, the leadership in Islam used the system of a dynasty by which the successor of the leader must be continued by his son or lineage. Also, some Islamic kingdoms were established. All of those kinds of leadership have brought the Muslims to the peak of civilization but then collapsed almost a century ago. They have disappeared from the entire Muslim societies. And now, Muslims fall behind the civilization of the West. This fact is hardly accepted by Muslims. Therefore, an imagination to come back to the glory of the past appears in the mind of some Muslim groups. They argue that the backwardness of the Muslim is caused by the ignorance of the Muslim to the *shari'ah* and does not follow the Islamic system of leadership taught by the prophet and his companions. Therefore, they initiated the reestablishment of *Khilāfat Islāmiyya*. HTI is one of the strongest proponents of this agenda. They say that *khilāfat* is a necessity for Muslims.

The proponents of the system of *khilāfat* believe that Muhammad, apart from being a prophet or messenger, was also a leader of the state. He was the leader both in politics and religion at the same time. Medina was believed as the Islamic state (*dawlah Islāmiyya*) built and led by him. It was the best prototype that must be adopted by the Muslims by applying the Islamic system. So, Islam is understood not only as a religion but also as a political system. The leadership was then continued by the four appointed *khalīfa* who institutionalize it after the demise of the prophet. So, *khilāfat* is nothing but a kind of ruling which aims to continue the prophet's legacy in leadership. Also, to support

³³ Abu Abdul Fattah and 'Ali Belhaj. *Menegakkan Kembali Negara Khilafah Kewajiban Terbesar dalam Islam*, (Bogor: Pustaka Thariqul Izzah, 2001), h. 1-6.

their idea, the proponents of *khilāfat* quote many Muslim scholars that they think supporting the establishment of *khilāfat* like Al-Mawardi, Ibn Taymiyah, Ibn Khaldun, Ibn Hazm, Al-Qurtubi, Al-Haytsami, An-Nawawi, etc. Meanwhile, the Qur’anic verses they refer to justify their idea is Q.S. al-Maidah: 48 as follows:

“So judge between them by what Allah has revealed and do not follow their inclinations away from what has come to you of the truth” (Q.S. Al-Maidah: 48).

Regarding the above verse, they say that it is the command to constitute the law that has been revealed by God. And constituting the revealed law of God implies the establishment of government by appointing *khalīfah*. According to them, the above verse does not address specifically to prophet therefore the command is general to the whole Muslims. So, the establishment of an Islamic caliphate is to implement the Islamic laws stated in the Qur’an, for instance, Islamic law deals with *hudud* (punishment). They argue that such law cannot be applied without applying the Islamic system of the government that is *khilāfat*. So, *khilāfat* and Islamic law complement each other. The realization of the former without realizing the latter is impossible. In this regard, they quote the theorem of the principle of jurisprudence which states *“the thing which makes obligation incomplete, that thing also becomes obligatory.”* The application of shari’ah is obligatory but will be incomplete without the establishment of the Islamic caliphate. Therefore, establishing an Islamic caliphate is also obligatory.

The proponents of the system of *khilāfat* become more confident when the global system especially in economics which recently adopts the system of capitalism and liberalism started declining. The economic crisis happened some years ago globally. And, Greece, one of the European countries, is still struggling to come out from the crisis up to now. In the Indonesian context, this gives an impact also when the Rupiah declined in value. In response to this, these groups passionately say that the capitalist and liberal system is untrustworthy so that *Khilāfat Islāmiyya* is the only solution for the economic problem of the world.

Even, as they believe in the perfectness of the system of the caliphate, they propose that any problems can be solved with this

system. If we open the website of HTI, we can find their explanation on how *khilāfat* will solve any problems like the rise of oil price, poverty, security, education, health, dryness, etc. Finally, their persistent support for the establishment of *khilāfat* is also because they rejected the system of democracy. They say that Islam does not recognize democracy and this system has caused disunity among the *ummah* (Muslim community). In the context of Indonesia, they reject Pancasila as the main principle of the state. Like other organizations which oppose secularism, HTI regards that the state must be based on Islamic laws (*shari'ah*), not human-made laws. HTI's opposition to the Indonesian government is very clear. In many functions, when the national anthem is being sung, they will not sing.

In Indonesia, HTI, as a mass organization is not registered in the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights (Kementerian Kehakiman dan HAM). It makes sense because with their agenda to establish an Islamic state which surely opposes the constitution of the state, HTI will not be legalized. HTI struggle should be comprehended in a broader sense. They do not create a political party like Ikhwanul Muslimin Indonesia which succeeded in creating PKS (The Prosperous Justice Party). Besides, HTI also disagrees with the utilization of violent action as they believe is not effective. But HTI's main concern is ideological implantation which they believe will be more successful though needs a long time. The leader of HT internationally is also unknown. In Indonesia, only their spokesperson, Ismail Yusanto, often appears in the public even on television. The government has finally dissolved HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia) on July 19, 2017, by revoking this organization's legal status. The dissolution was taken as HTI has an ideology contrary to Pancasila that is to establish *Khilafat Islamiyah*.

From the explanation above, concisely, the view of all those radical-fundamentalist Muslim groups can be seen in the chart as follows:

Organizations	Character	Influenced By	Goals
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)	Violence	DI Movement and Al-Qaeda	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Establishment of the Islamic State (<i>Daulah Islāmiyah</i>) and application of shari'ah. - Opposed to democracy, pluralism, and secularism.
MMI	Violence	DI Movement and JI	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Establishing Islamic state and application of shari'ah. - Opposed to democracy, pluralism, and secularism.
FPI	Violence	Salafis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Formalization of shari'ah without struggling to establish Islamic State. - Opposed to pluralism and secularism.

Organizations	Character	Influenced By	Goals
Ikhwanul Muslimin Indonesia and PKS	Non-violence	Ikhwanul Muslimin of Egypt	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Application of shari'ah and establishment of the Islamic caliphate. - Opposed to pluralism and secularism.
HTI	Non-violence	Hizbut Tahrir of Palestine	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Establishing Islamic caliphate and application of shari'ah. - Opposed to democracy, pluralism, and secularism.

Conclusion

Until today, Indonesia has become a place for the flourishing of Islamic organizations and groups. It happened especially after the Reformation Era, where freedom of opinion and expression was guaranteed by law. So it is not surprising that since the Reformation Era, various Islamic organizations have emerged with different ideologies and models of movement. Among these Islamic organizations are the *Jemaah Islamiyah* (JI), the *Islamic Defenders Front* (FPI), the *Indonesian Muslim Brotherhood* (IM), the *Indonesian Mujahidin Council* (MMI), and *Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia* (HTI). These organizations are generally influenced by transnational Islamic organizations such as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Hizbut Tahrir, the Salafi groups, and even al-Qaeda. However, these organizations have different models of movement to achieve their goals. Some of them apply violence, such as JI, MMI, and FPI. Meanwhile, others are categorized as non-violence, such as the Ikhwanul Muslimin (who later established PKS) and HTI,

because they believe that violence is not effective to achieve their goals. Meanwhile, the goals of these groups are generally almost the same, i.e. implementing Islamic law (*shari'ah*), establishing an Islamic state or Islamic caliphate (*Khilafat Islamiyah*), rejecting the democratic system, as well as the ideology of pluralism and secularism.

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