JUSTICE IN HUMAN RIGHTS COURTS: INTEGRATING THE CONCEPT OF ISLAMIC JUDICIARY AND THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

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Abstract

This study aims to analyze the concept of justice in Human Rights Courts through the integration of Islamic judicial principles and international legal norms. The research employs a normative-comparative juridical approach by examining primary and secondary legal sources, including international human rights instruments, Islamic legal provisions, and jurisprudential practices of national and international human rights courts. The analysis applies a qualitative and hermeneutic legal method to identify the points of convergence between the two systems in achieving substantive justice. The findings reveal that both Islamic and international legal systems share an ethical foundation centered on human dignity and moral accountability for human rights violations. The integration of these legal traditions strengthens the moral legitimacy and effectiveness of human rights adjudication, particularly in Muslim-majority countries. This research highlights the importance of cross-system legal dialogue in developing a universal paradigm of justice that transcends formal legality and embodies deeper humanistic and spiritual values

Keywords : Justice, Human Rights Court, Islamic Judiciary, International Law, Legal Integration, Human Rights

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INTRODUCTION

Justice stands as the central pillar of every legal system, whether national or international. Within the framework of human rights law, justice is understood not only as the fulfillment of individual rights but also as an instrument to maintain balance between rights, obligations, and the state's responsibility toward its citizens. International law places justice as a universal value underlying the formation of global legal instruments, including the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 1948* and the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 1966*.[1]

However, in practice, justice often becomes a relative concept that depends on social, cultural, and legal contexts. In the Islamic legal tradition, *al-'adl* (justice) occupies a central position that extends beyond formal legality to include moral, spiritual, and social dimensions.[2] Justice in Islam requires a balance between individual rights and public welfare, placing divine values as the ultimate reference in judicial processes.[3]

Meanwhile, the modern international legal system, which originated from Western legal traditions, perceives justice primarily through a rational and positivistic lens. Principles such as *due process of law*, *equality before the law*, and *the right to a fair trial* are treated as universal standards that all nations must uphold. Yet, this positivistic approach is often criticized for neglecting moral and spiritual considerations that are essential to the substantive understanding of justice within Islamic law.[4]

This conceptual gap has sparked both academic and practical debates within the field of human rights adjudication. International human rights tribunals such as the *International Criminal Court (ICC)* and the *International Court of Justice (ICJ)* are frequently confronted with questions regarding whether the principles of justice they apply can truly be considered

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[1] United Nations, *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (New York: United Nations, 1948), Articles 1–10.

[2] Muhammad Abu Zahrah, *Ushul al-Fiqh* (Cairo: Dar al-Fikr al-Arabi, 1958), 45–46.

[3] Abdullah Ahmed an-Na'im, *Toward an Islamic Reformation: Civil Liberties, Human Rights, and International Law* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1990), 87.

[4] Malcolm N. Shaw, *International Law*, 9th ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021), 146–150.

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universal and acceptable to non-Western legal traditions, particularly those rooted in Islamic jurisprudence.[5]

Indonesia, as the world's largest Muslim-majority country, holds a strategic position in bridging the paradigmatic divide between Islamic and international law. Domestically, human rights adjudication is governed by Law No. 26 of 2000 on Human Rights Courts, which serves as the main judicial mechanism for addressing serious human rights violations. However, significant challenges remain in ensuring that the principles of justice applied in these courts are compatible with Islamic legal values deeply embedded in Indonesian society.[6]

This study emerges from the concern over the normative and philosophical gap between justice in Islamic law and justice in international law. Such disparity may lead to disharmony in the application of human rights law, especially when courts must adjudicate cases involving moral and religious values that diverge from international legal standards.[7]

The integration between Islamic judicial concepts and international legal principles is not intended to replace one system with the other, but rather to identify points of convergence that can enrich the global discourse on justice. This integrative approach embodies the spirit of universalism while acknowledging plural legal and moral traditions, thereby enhancing the legitimacy of international law among Muslim societies.[8]

Throughout the intellectual history of Islamic jurisprudence, classical scholars have long discussed the universal dimension of justice. Al-Mawardi, for instance, emphasized *al-'adl* as the primary foundation of governance and judiciary, while Ibn Taymiyyah asserted that justice is the purpose of every law, even toward non-Muslims.[9] These perspectives demonstrate that Islamic law possesses the normative potential to contribute

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[5] Antonio Cassese, *International Criminal Law*, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 32–33.

[6] Republic of Indonesia, *Law No. 26 of 2000 on Human Rights Courts*, State Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia Year 2000 No. 208.

[7] M. Cherif Bassiouni, "Human Rights in the Context of Islamic Law," *Fordham International Law Journal* 12, no. 1 (1988): 1–40.

[8] Mashood A. Baderin, *International Human Rights and Islamic Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 15–16.

[9] Al-Mawardi, *Al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyyah* (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah, 1996), 27; Ibn Taymiyyah, *Al-Siyasah al-Shar'iyyah* (Riyadh: Dar al-'Asimah, 1998), 12–13.

to the development of international human rights law through its substantive vision of justice.

In modern international law, the notion of justice has also evolved—from a focus on procedural justice to one emphasizing substantive justice, particularly the restoration of victims' rights and state accountability. This paradigm shift is evident in the emergence of *transitional justice* and *restorative justice* practices increasingly adopted across both national and international jurisdictions.[10]

Accordingly, the conceptual integration between Islamic and international law is not merely theoretical but also carries practical implications for human rights adjudication in Muslim-majority countries, including Indonesia. A more inclusive approach that accommodates Islamic values in the enforcement of human rights law can enhance public confidence in judicial institutions while improving the effectiveness of justice delivery at the national level.[11]

Moreover, such an integrative approach could serve as Indonesia's intellectual contribution to the advancement of contemporary international law. As a nation with a pluralistic legal system, Indonesia has a unique experience in harmonizing multiple legal traditions an experience that could become a model for integrating local and religious norms into the global human rights framework.[12]

This study aims to critically examine how principles of justice within Islamic law can be integrated into the practice of human rights adjudication grounded in international law. Employing normative-juridical and comparative approaches, it explores the relevance of Islamic values to the universal legal principles embodied in major human rights instruments.

Consequently, this research seeks to contribute to the development of a more inclusive and context-sensitive theory of justice within international law. The integrative approach between Islamic judicial concepts and international legal principles provides a balanced pathway between universal ideals and legal pluralism. Through this synthesis, it is expected that a new

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[10] Ruti Teitel, *Transitional Justice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 5–7.

[11] Satya Arinanto, *Human Rights in Indonesia's Political Transition* (Jakarta: UI Press, 2012), 91–93.

[12] Hikmahanto Juwana, "Legal Pluralism and the Challenges of Human Rights Enforcement in Indonesia," *Indonesian Journal of International Law* 7, no. 2 (2010): 211–230.

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paradigm of human rights justice may emerge one that harmonizes universal human dignity with the moral and spiritual values inherent in Islamic jurisprudence.

METHOD

This study employs a normative legal research design within a qualitative approach. This type of research was chosen because the main focus of the study lies in the integration of legal norms derived from both the international legal system and the concept of Islamic judiciary. The normative approach involves the analysis of primary legal materials such as international legal instruments including the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 1948*, the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 1966*, and the *Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998* along with Islamic legal sources such as the Qur'an, Hadith, and classical juristic opinions (*fuqaha*). This approach illustrates a systemic relationship between universal values of justice and the moral-normative foundation of *sharia*, thereby identifying the harmonization of both within the framework of modern human rights law.[13]

The research was conducted between January and July 2025, supported by access to legal and academic databases such as HeinOnline, LexisNexis, and the Scopus Journal Database. These databases were utilized to trace contemporary legal scholarship on justice in international human rights adjudication and Islamic judicial concepts. The research subjects comprise the concept of justice in international human rights courts and substantive justice in Islamic law. The target of this research is to identify a model of normative integration that bridges both legal systems international and Islamicin theory and practice.[14]

The research procedure began with the inventory of legal materials, both primary and secondary, relevant to justice, human rights adjudication, and Islamic legal principles. The collected data were classified based on their relevance to the theme of legal integration. A comparative-conceptual

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[13] Satjipto Rahardjo, *Ilmu Hukum* (Bandung: Citra Aditya Bakti, 2006), 45–46; see also Peter Mahmud Marzuki, *Penelitian Hukum* (Jakarta: Kencana, 2017), 35.

[14] Hilaire McCoubrey and Nigel D. White, *Textbook on Jurisprudence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 78–80; see also M. Tahir Azhary, *Negara Hukum: Suatu Studi tentang Prinsip-Prinsipnya Dilihat dari Segi Hukum Islam, Implementasinya pada Periode Negara Madinah dan Masa Kini* (Jakarta: Kencana, 2015), 102.

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analysis was then conducted to determine the intersections and divergences between international and Islamic legal systems in interpreting justice. The data were analyzed using descriptive-analytical and legal hermeneutical methods to extract the theological and juridical meanings of justice.[15]

The data analysis employed a qualitative normative analysis using a deductive reasoning pattern, moving from general legal principles to specific conclusions. Data validity was ensured through source triangulation, involving comparison among primary and secondary legal materials and validation through expert opinions from both Islamic and international legal scholars. The research strictly adheres to academic ethics, including full citation of all references, respect for intellectual property rights, and objectivity in interpretation. Therefore, the findings are expected to provide both theoretical and conceptual contributions to the development of human rights law studies from an integrative perspective combining Islamic law and international law.[16]

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A. Comparative Analysis: Islamic Adjudication and International Human Rights Justice

Islamic judicial philosophy rests upon the belief that the ultimate source of justice is divine revelation, yet its implementation requires human interpretation through *ijtihad*.[17] The interpretive process, historically developed through *usul al-fiqh*, parallels the interpretive reasoning of international tribunals, which construct legal meaning from treaty texts and customary norms.[18] In both traditions, the role of the judge becomes transformative: neither a mechanical applier of law nor an autonomous moral agent, but a mediator between textual authority and moral reasoning. This interpretive similarity reveals that despite their different epistemological bases, both systems recognize the creative dimension of adjudication.

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[15] Soerjono Soekanto, *Pengantar Penelitian Hukum* (Jakarta: UI Press, 2008), 43–45; Jasser Auda, *Maqasid al-Shariah as Philosophy of Islamic Law* (London: The International Institute of Islamic Thought, 2008), 22–24.

[16] Johnny Ibrahim, *Teori dan Metodologi Penelitian Hukum Normatif* (Malang: Bayumedia, 2006), 57–58; Malcolm N. Shaw, *International Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 115–116.

[17] Wael B. Hallaq, *A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction to Sunni Usul al-Fiqh* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 21–23.

[18] Richard Gardiner, *Treaty Interpretation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 33–34.

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The concept of *ijtihad* as dynamic reasoning in Islamic law mirrors the *teleological interpretation* used by international courts such as the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), where texts are interpreted in light of contemporary moral standards.[19] This doctrinal convergence suggests that both legal orders are capable of moral evolution without abandoning their foundational principles. For instance, just as Muslim jurists employ *maslahah mursalah* (public interest) to adapt the law to new realities, international judges invoke the *living instrument doctrine* to adjust human rights norms to societal progress.[20] Such methodological parallels provide a strong intellectual foundation for integrating moral reasoning across religious and secular adjudicative systems.

Nevertheless, the fundamental difference lies in accountability. In Islamic adjudication, the *qadi* answers not only to the community but to God, embodying the dual responsibility of legal and spiritual integrity.[21] In contrast, international judges derive legitimacy from procedural fairness, impartiality, and institutional independence.[22] While the Islamic system anchors justice in divine ethics, the international framework grounds it in institutional rationality. Yet both models share the objective of preventing arbitrariness and upholding moral responsibility in adjudication a convergence that invites rethinking global justice through ethical universality.[23]

A case-based reflection further demonstrates this synergy. In the jurisprudence of the Indonesian Human Rights Court, particularly in the trials related to East Timor and Tanjung Priok, judges struggled between the demands of moral justice and procedural legality. [24] Similar dilemmas occur in international tribunals when political considerations constrain judicial independence, as seen in the ICC's handling of the Darfur and Palestine situations. Islamic judicial philosophy offers a solution by emphasizing the

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[19] George Letsas, *A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 56.

[20] Jasser Auda, *Maqasid al-Shariah as Philosophy of Islamic Law*, 102.

[21] Mohammad Hashim Kamali, *Shari'ah Law: An Introduction* (Oxford: Oneworld, 2008), 114–115.

[22] William Schabas, *The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 89.

[23] John Finnis, *Natural Law and Natural Rights* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 145–146.

[24] Tim Lindsey and Simon Butt, *The Constitution of Indonesia: A Contextual Analysis* (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2018), 213–215.

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maqasid-oriented balance between justice and mercy, illustrating how ethical intentionality can reinforce procedural justice.[25] When applied thoughtfully, this principle may restore human moral agency to the often bureaucratic framework of international adjudication.

The ethical integration between Islam and international law can also be viewed through the concept of *adl al-kawn* (cosmic justice), which posits that justice sustains the balance of the universe.[26] In modern international law, the equivalent notion manifests in the doctrine of *jus cogens* peremptory norms from which no derogation is permitted. Both represent an ultimate moral order that transcends state consent and individual will. By interpreting *jus cogens* through the moral lens of *adl al-kawn*, we discover that the commitment to universal justice is not a Western innovation but a reaffirmation of an older, spiritually grounded idea of moral equilibrium.[27]

Analyzing international adjudication through the prism of Islamic ethics illuminates hidden assumptions within secular jurisprudence. International law often claims neutrality, yet its moral vocabulary dignity, responsibility, humanity reflects universal ethical intuitions consistent with Islamic anthropology.[28] For example, the ICC's emphasis on the protection of human dignity in its *Lubanga* judgment resonates deeply with the Qur'anic affirmation of human sanctity (*karamat al-insan*).[29] This shared moral grammar suggests that integration between the two systems does not require assimilation but recognition: acknowledgment that the pursuit of justice is a shared human enterprise grounded in both divine revelation and human reason.

This comparative exploration reveals a profound potential for cross-normative enrichment. Rather than juxtaposing Islam and international law as opposites, the analysis demonstrates their capacity for mutual correction. Islamic adjudication contributes moral transcendence and ethical teleology,

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[25] Mohammad Fadel, "The True, the Good and the Reasonable: The Theological and Ethical Roots of Public Reason in Islamic Law," *Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence* 21, no. 1 (2008): 22–24.

[26] Ismail R. al-Faruqi, *Al-Tawhid: Its Implications for Thought and Life* (Herndon: IIIT, 1982), 95–97.

[27] Mashood A. Baderin, *International Human Rights and Islamic Law*, 78–79.

[28] Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, *Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari'a* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008), 66.

[29] *Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo*, ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment (March 14, 2012), para. 586.

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while international adjudication provides procedural rigor and institutional accountability. The synthesis of these elements could yield a jurisprudence that is simultaneously moral and modern, grounded in both ethical universality and procedural equality. Such integration is not merely theoretical but offers a practical framework for constructing a global justice system that harmonizes moral conviction with legal rationality.

B. Toward Jurisprudential Synthesis and Ethical Reintegration in Global Adjudication

The integration of Islamic and international legal reasoning invites a re-evaluation of justice as a process rather than a static outcome. In Islamic epistemology, justice is an ever-renewing act of maintaining moral balance (*mizan*) and social harmony (*islah*).[30] Meanwhile, in international law, justice is proceduralized codified in statutes and judicial mechanisms that seek predictability. The encounter between these two models creates a unique interpretive space: one that views procedural fairness not merely as legality but as a moral obligation. This shift moves adjudication from the realm of formalism toward substantive moral reasoning rooted in both divine ethics and human rationality.

Within this conceptual reorientation, the idea of *niyyah* (intention) acquires renewed importance. In Islamic jurisprudence, intention shapes the moral value of an action; in adjudication, it contextualizes judicial discretion. The same can be found in international courts, where the motive of state or individual actors determines responsibility, as in *mens rea* in international criminal law.[31] This moral-intentional dimension enhances our understanding of justice as more than external conformity to law it becomes a reflective engagement with human purpose. Such convergence demonstrates that legal norms cannot achieve legitimacy without moral intentionality, bridging divine ethics and secular accountability.

The dialogical relationship between *maqasid al-shariah* (objectives of Islamic law) and the *purposive interpretation* of international human rights treaties presents an intriguing avenue of harmonization. Both methods prioritize the protection of essential human values life, dignity, liberty, and

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[30] Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas, *Prolegomena to the Metaphysics of Islam* (Kuala Lumpur: ISTAC, 1995), 122–123.

[31] Antonio Cassese, *International Criminal Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 165–166.

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welfare over rigid textualism. The *maqasid* framework provides a theological grounding for what international lawyers term "human security."[32] Conversely, the interpretive openness of international adjudication offers a pragmatic structure to realize *maqasid* ideals in contemporary governance. Together, they suggest a jurisprudence capable of integrating spiritual purpose with institutional accountability.

The cross-fertilization of these ideas has tangible consequences for the structure of global justice. When international adjudication incorporates moral teleology, it transforms from a bureaucratic system into an ethical enterprise. Islamic philosophy of law enriches this transformation by reintroducing transcendence into human rights discourse, ensuring that the idea of dignity remains anchored in something beyond political consensus. The interplay between transcendence and institutionalism yields a third path: a legal universalism that neither secularizes faith nor theologizes law but reconciles moral and procedural justice.[33]

At the empirical level, Indonesia provides a living laboratory for this synthesis. The coexistence of Islamic legal reasoning and participation in international human rights mechanisms creates a dual commitment to both divine and universal norms. Decisions from Indonesian Human Rights Courts illustrate this tension, where judges often balance procedural compliance with moral conscience, particularly in cases involving crimes against humanity.[34] When judges invoke ethical reasoning consistent with *maqasid*, they not only fulfill national legal duties but also contribute to global justice discourse. This practice affirms that ethical adjudication is not an abstraction but a lived judicial experience.

A final conceptual insight emerges from examining how both systems approach the idea of mercy (*rahmah*). In Islamic adjudication, mercy complements justice, ensuring that punishment never eclipses compassion. In contrast, international adjudication often views mercy as a political prerogative rather than a judicial virtue. However, restorative justice movements such as victim–offender reconciliation programs and truth

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[32] Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom* (New York: Knopf, 1999), 33–34.

[33] Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, *Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari'a*, 187–188.

[34] Simon Butt and Tim Lindsey, *The Constitution of Indonesia: A Contextual Analysis*, 220–222.

commissions demonstrate a growing recognition of mercy's judicial value.[35] The infusion of *rahmah* into global adjudication could humanize international criminal justice, transforming it from punitive retribution into moral restoration.

C. Integrative Jurisprudence and the Renewal of Global Justice Discourse

The intersection of Islamic judicial ethics and international adjudication offers not merely a comparative framework but a new intellectual paradigm for understanding justice. In this view, law is not a self contained system of commands but an evolving moral dialogue between divine purpose and human reason.[49] When Islamic metaphysics of justice informs the procedural rationality of international law, adjudication becomes an act of moral translation—transforming transcendent ideals into institutional practice.[36] Such transformation reveals that universal justice requires more than consensus; it demands the moral imagination to reconcile heaven's ethics with earth's institutions.

This integrative framework redefines human rights adjudication as a spiritual as well as legal enterprise. The Qur'anic notion of *shahadah* (bearing witness) parallels the judicial act itself standing before truth, weighing evidence, and rendering justice as a testimony to moral order.[37] Similarly, international judges, though operating in a secular context, perform a form of moral witnessing when affirming human dignity against violence and tyranny. This shared vocation between divine duty and secular responsibility exposes the inner moral continuity of global adjudication. The result is a jurisprudence that treats judgment not as punishment alone, but as moral restoration of the human condition.

Integrating Islamic moral epistemology into international adjudication also challenges the dominance of Western liberal assumptions about

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[35] Ruti Teitel, *Transitional Justice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 58–59.

[36] Seyyed Hossein Nasr, *Religion and the Order of Nature* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 211–212.

[37] Fazlur Rahman, *Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 108–109.

universality.[38] The traditional narrative of international law, shaped by post-Enlightenment rationalism, often assumes moral neutrality. Islamic jurisprudence disrupts this by asserting that neutrality itself is a moral choice a silence before truth.[39] The encounter between these traditions forces international law to reexamine its metaphysical foundations, urging it to acknowledge that justice cannot exist without an orientation toward the good. This moral reawakening could reinvigorate human rights law with a renewed sense of sacred responsibility.

At the normative level, this synthesis can be operationalized through interpretive principles that merge moral intentionality and procedural legitimacy. For instance, the incorporation of *maqasid*-based reasoning into judicial interpretation can enrich the application of proportionality tests in human rights jurisprudence. Likewise, the Islamic doctrine of *istihsan* (juristic preference) can inspire flexible judicial discretion in balancing equity and legality.[40] By embedding ethical intentionality within procedural justice, this integrative jurisprudence allows international courts to maintain objectivity without moral indifference—creating a model of judgment that is principled, compassionate, and contextually human.

The ethical synthesis achieved through this dialogue also has implications for international legal education and policy-making. Law schools, judicial academies, and policy forums can no longer treat Islamic legal thought as an external or regional system but as a coequal philosophical partner in global legal theory. The incorporation of Islamic moral philosophy into global discourse could yield new normative vocabularies justice as balance, mercy as restoration, and law as stewardship.[41] These concepts do not replace liberal legal theory; they deepen it, providing the metaphysical depth that modern positivism lacks. In doing so, this integrative approach reframes international law as both an ethical project and a civilizational conversation.

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[38] Martti Koskenniemi, *The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–1960* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 313–315.

[39] Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), 253–254.

[40] Jasser Auda, *Maqasid al-Shariah as Philosophy of Islamic Law*, 176–177.

[41] Tariq Ramadan, *Islam, the West and the Challenges of Modernity* (Leicester: Islamic Foundation, 2001), 154–155.

Ultimately, the integration of Islamic and international legal traditions envisions a post-secular model of global justice: one that acknowledges divine morality without theocracy, and rational order without nihilism. In this paradigm, the pursuit of justice becomes a shared human and spiritual endeavor an act of harmonizing divine command with human dignity. Such harmonization transcends the dichotomy of religion and modernity, affirming that the law's highest vocation is not the control of conduct but the cultivation of conscience.[61] This concluding synthesis thus points toward a renewed understanding of global adjudication: not as a clash of civilizations, but as a communion of moral intelligences seeking justice for humanity in all its dimensions.[42]

Conclusion

1. This study demonstrates that justice in human rights adjudication cannot be fully understood through either the positivist lens of international law or the theological frame of Islamic jurisprudence alone. The comparative exploration has revealed that both systems share a deeper moral aspiration: to protect human dignity through mechanisms that combine rational order and ethical intentionality. Where international law ensures the institutional realization of justice, Islamic judicial philosophy ensures its moral authenticity. The intersection of these two traditions therefore transforms adjudication into a holistic pursuit of moral and legal equilibrium.

2. The analysis underscores that both frameworks, despite distinct epistemologies, converge on a common teleological axis justice as the preservation of human integrity. The Islamic concept of *maqasid al-shariah* provides a moral compass that guides legal reasoning toward the protection of essential values, while international human rights law offers a procedural and universal structure to implement them.[2] The fusion of these approaches challenges the perceived dichotomy between divine morality and secular legality, proposing instead that law derives legitimacy not only from procedural validity but also from its ethical telos.

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[42] Seyyed Hossein Nasr, *Knowledge and the Sacred*, 311–312.

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3. Furthermore, this synthesis invites a rethinking of international adjudication as an inherently moral enterprise. Judges, whether in The Hague or Jakarta, act not merely as interpreters of rules but as moral witnesses to human suffering and resilience. The integration of Islamic ethical principles such as *niyyah* (intention), *rahmah* (compassion), and *adl* (justice) infuses adjudication with spiritual responsibility, ensuring that the exercise of legal authority remains tethered to humanity's moral consciousness. This convergence opens a pathway toward a global legal culture that balances procedural impartiality with ethical empathy.

4. The implications of this study extend beyond theoretical dialogue. They offer a blueprint for developing an integrative jurisprudence that situates moral reasoning within the institutional logic of international law. Such an approach can revitalize human rights adjudication by grounding it in a universal moral anthropology one that recognizes justice as a shared human and divine vocation. In doing so, international law is not merely expanded; it is deepened, reconnected to the metaphysical roots of human dignity that transcend time, culture, and creed.

5. In conclusion, the dialogue between Islamic judicial thought and international legal principles affirms that global justice need not arise from uniformity but from moral harmony. The encounter of these traditions demonstrates that universality in law is not the erasure of difference but the articulation of shared values within diversity. Through this integrative vision, justice emerges not only as an institutional achievement but as a reflection of humanity's continuous striving to align moral truth with legal order an enduring pursuit that keeps both divine guidance and human reason in creative balance.

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